Managing Change in Healthcare Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 2750 words

Managing Change in Healthcare - Essay Example Some of the most favored approaches that have been preferred are cycle-time reduction, process engineering, and total quality management (TQM), with which companies have tried to flatten the organizational structure [3]. However, structural change programs on its own are likely to fail as they do not account for the human element, which actually forms the structure. Change management must work towards removing fear, cynicism, and defensiveness from the minds of the people. In the healthcare sector of US, the practice of midwifery was almost eliminated by concerted effort of university educated physicians [11]. The changes in perceptions about the profession of midwifery and its reinstatement into the healthcare industry, started in 1939, with the Frontier Nursing Service and has since then passed through various changes and reconstruction [11]. To enhance the performance of an organization it is important to improve the performance of the individuals and groups that comprise that organization. When organizations set new goals, they must also take care to see that the employees are made aware of these new goals well in advance or better still the company can set the new goals after consulting the employees. The employees must be backed by timely and adequate infrastructure to attain the goals; proper feedbacks and timely interventions must be integrated into the system. The Midwives Alliance of North America (MANA) was formed in 1982 and the struggle and persistent effort of the initial women of the midwifery profession has enabled it to get a legitimate status in 33 states of the country [11]. Managing Change - The Impact of Relevant Theory on the Change Process Aims Technological development has ushered in changes across organizations and our personal world. In the midst of these changes to better and sophisticated machines, it is important to remember that people form the basis of organizations. Technology makes structured and repetitive work easy while people use their intelligence to think, create, and solve. The major change today is the transformation of the work force from an information worker to an information user or what can be better described as a knowledge worker. Peter Drucker in his 'The New Society of Organization' has said, that the world economy is transforming to a knowledge society, where knowledge is the primary resource for the economy and for the individuals. In such an economy, according to Drucker, the competitive advantage comes not from the research and development of technology but from the skill and expertise of the knowledge workers, who form the organization [2]. The legitimacy of midwifery as a practice was established by the vision and persistence of the traditional midwifery experts, who encouraged self regulation in the next generation. Their efforts paid off and by the 1980's the standards of practice and certification began to be established in one state after another. The Midwives Alliance of North America (MANA) was formed in 1982, to help the movement gain support and legitimacy [11]. Issues Affecting Change and Personal Behavior Healthcare organizations are different from other organizations, as they involve something beyond business. According to

The strength of Ammonia Double Essay Example for Free

The strength of Ammonia Double Essay In this investigation I am trying to find out if doubling the strength of ammonia doubles the rate of its diffusion. There are a few factors that may have an effect on the results of this investigation. For example, the size of the test tube, the distances between each piece of litmus paper and the amount of ammonia on the wool. The longer or wider the test tube the more time it will take for the ammonia molecules to diffuse along the tube which would increase the time on the results table. A similar principle would apply to the distance between litmus papers. The ammonia is most likely to reach the litmus paper closest to it first and then to the second as it will take more time for the ammonia molecules to diffuse across the tube. Also each time the ammonia is applied to the wool it must be the same amount for every test carried out, otherwise the test would be unfair. This is because the amount of ammonia affects the speed at which the molecules travel. If too much ammonia is applied then the molecules would move faster along the tube, but if there is less ammonia the molecules would move slowly down the tube. Three additional things that affect the rate of diffusion of the ammonia include molecular size, temperature and the concentration of the ammonia. My investigation is aimed at discovering the effects of doubling the strength (concentration) of ammonia on the rate of diffusion. I think increasing the concentration of ammonia will decrease the amount of time it will take for the litmus paper to turn blue i. e. diffusion will be faster. However, decreasing the concentration of ammonia will increase the amount of time it will take for the litmus paper to turn blue i.e. diffusion will be slower. Doubling the strength of ammonia could have an effect on the rate of diffusion because it doubles the number of molecules, which collide more. Consequently, the particles in a gas will spread out and thus have greater space to move around more quickly and easily. This is how ammonia particles will look in the form of a gas as they collide and spread: To make this investigation a fair test, I am going to space out the litmus papers but not too far apart and evenly spread out each of the seven litmus papers I intend to use. I will also use the same volume of ammonia to make it a fair test each time. The concentration will, however, gradually be doubled. I will start with 0. 5% double it to 1%, 2% and finally 4%. To carry out this experiment using a stopwatch to measure how long it takes for each red litmus paper to turn blue. I will take 1 reading every time a litmus paper changes colour, which will result in 7 readings for every test. Then I will obtain the results taken by two other people in my team and average them out by adding the results up and dividing by 3. This will give me a reliable answer as to how long it took for each of the seven litmus papers to turn from red to blue. So the number of tests to be performed in total is 3 and so by multiplying 3 with 7 will equal 21 results being taken from 21 litmus papers changing colour. These results will be taken in seconds but I shall convert any that are given in minutes by the stopwatch, into seconds. OBTAINING EVIDENCE The table below show my results: The Concentration Of Ammonia Litmus paper no  To perform this experiment safely it was necessary that we wore goggles and used tongs to pick up the cotton wool that had ammonia on it. ANALYSING RESULTS/DRAW CONCLUSION I have drawn a graph on a piece of graph paper to show the pattern in my results. The pattern shows that as you double the concentration of ammonia, the quicker it takes to change colour from red to blue. This is because, as I had predicted, increasing the concentration also increases the number of molecules, which collide more. Consequently, the ammonia molecules spread out to make greater space to move around more quickly and easily. EVALUATING. The experiment appears to have been successful as I acted according to my plans and achieved the results I had expected. My results could be improved by carrying out the tests a few more times, in order to achieve more accurate results. I can conclude from my results that doubling the strength of ammonia doubles the rate of its diffusion. A pattern in my results also showed that a as you double the concentration of ammonia, the average time is twice as less. However, this pattern was not apparent when I increased the concentration of ammonia from 0. 5% to 1%. On that occasion it seems that the time had reduced by more than just a half. The reduction in time was usually approximately by half, but by drawing a line of best fit through my graph, it can be said that doubling the concentration of ammonia does double the rate of diffusion. Show preview only The above preview is unformatted text This student written piece of work is one of many that can be found in our GCSE Patterns of Behaviour section. Download this essay Print Save Not the one? .

Developing Leadership and a Team

Developing Leadership and a Team What is Team? According to Dee Hock (1999), Founder and CEO Emeritus of Visa International says, Control is not leadership; management is not leadership; leadership is leadership. If you seek to lead, invest at least 50% of your time leading yourself for your own purpose, ethics, principles, motivation, and conduct. Invest at least 20% leading those with authority over you and 15% leading your friends. If you do not understand you work for your mislabelled â€Å"subordinates,† then you know nothing of leadership. You know only tyranny (an absolute power). Team Development Participating in or observing the development of a team is absolutely interesting, sometimes it is disturbing, often both. So many factors influence the process, whether the team is to work face to face or electronically or in some combination of contexts. Developing by Stages It is traditional to talk about phases of team development, if each group or team followed a nice linear growth sequence. Most teams however, are not that predictable. Each develops through its own process but each also manage issues that brings its members together, drive them apart, push them to accomplish goals, hold them back, move them forward. These issues arise in different sequences for different teams, being aware of them can help to share leadership as we recognise the development issues in your team. Consider the following â€Å"phases† not as specific periods but as development issues that vary from team to team. Phases as Development Issues Researcher has noticed that short-term groups not teams proceed through orientation through groups, conflict, emergence of a proposed decision and mutual reinforcement as well as commitment of the group to a decision (Fisher, 1970). Other observations have similarly classified stages as forming (orienting to one another), storming (conflicting), norming (becoming a team with processes for managing strife), performing (getting the job done), and adjourning (saying good bye). (Tuckman and Jenson, 1977). Source: Self-Copied from http://www.jiscinfonet.ac.uk/InfoKits/infokit-related-files/tuckman-model-pic Developmental Issues for Specific Team The developmental patterns just discussed to understand the processes a group might experience, but the most useful information is that how your team develops depends in part on its type and its purpose or purposes. Gersick (1988) observed real world project teams, fund raising committees, corporate and health care teams and university teams. All had specific projects and tasks, used shared leadership and met for an extended period of time. Gersicks observations directly relate to the kinds of teams most people experience, He found a general pattern: 1. At their first meetings, teams activities varied with their respective tasks 2. Several meetings dealt with conflicts, getting information, and working through issues 3. The mid point crisis meeting was focused according to the teams purpose. Various teams dealt with decisions about goals, revising drafts of reports, outlining programs or managing conflicts. 4. After this transition, teams went through another series of meetings to wo rk out details of their tasks. 5. This led to the final completion meeting, in which each team finalised its work according to the type and purpose of the team. Leadership skills, approaches and strategies Most recently, two theories of leadership has emerged. Bass (1990) first distinguished between two of them: transactional leadership, which exchanges rewards for performance and transformational leadership, which elevates, motivates, inspires and develops the team. Transactional leaders set goals, clarify desired outcomes, provide feedback and give subordinates rewards for good work. On the other hand, transformational leaders motivate their followers through more subtle- but very effective means and these strategies tend to result in high worker satisfaction (Sparks and Schenk, 2001). The key achieving sustainable business success is to have excellence in leadership at all three levels. Strategic, operational and team leaders need to work harmoniously together as the organisations leadership team. The most common and most expensive error that organisations are making at present is to focus leadership development on their more senior managers, so that become their entire ‘strategy. In doing, they are completely ignoring their team leaders. Yet it is the team leader who is closest to the customer. Make sure that the strategy embraces all three levels. There is useful distinction to be made between strategic thinking and strategic planning. Leadership strategy should evolve and guided by a small steering group as a part of overall business strategy. It should be longer term, for a strategy worth the name should be three dimensional: †¢ Importance-it really has to matter †¢ long term- it takes time to grow trees †¢ multi factored-it takes more than one element or approach to make strategy Different Leadership styles This style works just fine for a team of real experts who want to share leadership and charge ahead. For other teams, however, productivity, quality, involvement and satisfaction suffer. Authoritarian (or autocratic) leadership is just what it sounds like. The authoritarian leader keep tight control, runs meetings by the book, sets schedules, and may use coercive or reward power. Authoritarian leadership often increases productivity in the short term, but it also increases aggression and turnover rates among members. Some people equate authoritarianism with leadership, however and their expectations are met by an authoritarian leader. Democratic leadership fits the western ideal. The democratic leader ensures that everyone is heard, guides and facilitates discussion and decision making, and shares power. Democratic leaders do three important things. First, they make sure everyone in the group feels responsible for outcomes. Second, they enhance the groups feelings of empowerment. Finally, they create processes through which the team can make effective decisions. Overtime, each member in the group develops the expertise (and, hopefully, the desire) to perform these ro les as well; ultimately everyone can take turns serving as both leaders and followers. According to Likert, R. in 1961 distinguished between four key styles or systems of leadership. System 1: Exploitative autocratic- which is the essence of authoritarian style System 2: Benevolent authoritative- is basically paternalistic style. There is a limited element of reward, but communication is restricted. Policy is made at the top but there is some restricted delegation with in strictly defined procedures. System 3: Participative-The leaser has some incomplete confidence in subordinates, listens to them but controls decision making, motivates by reward and a level of involvement and will use the ideas and suggestions of subordinates constructively. System 4: Democratic- Management gives economic rewards, rather than pats on the head, utilises full group participation and involves teams in goal setting and improving work methods and communication flows up and down. There is a close psychol ogical relationship between superiors and subordinates. Decision making is permitted at all levels and is integrated into the formal structure with reference to the organisational chart. He recognised that each style is relevant in some situations; for example in a crisis, a system 1 approach is usually required. Alternatively when introducing a new system of work, system 4 would be more effective. It shows that effective managers are those who adopt either a system 3 or a system 4 leadership style. Both are seen as being based on trust and paying attention to the needs of both the organisation and employees. Developing Leadership skills It is very easy to explain leadership, but it is hard to practise it. Action comes first in leadership and then skills. People always like to follow the good leaders because they trust and respect them, rather than following the leadership skills they have. Leadership depends on the skills of Management but it is quite different from Management. Management really depends on the planning, company and communication skills. Leadership should have such type of qualities like integration, honesty, and commitment; also have knowledge to share the ideas with his team members and mutual understanding, sincerity, passion. New and experienced leader alike, decision making has gown more complicated then ever. Leaders must make choices quickly often with the small information at hand. If we want to develop a greater tolerance for ambiguity and be willing to constantly reinvent the way your teams operate. Also want to gather more input on key decisions from people at every level of your organisation, as well as learn how to assess the reasons behind a decision before taking the force and implementing it. In 1999, for example, management thinkers and executives from the private and non profit sectors gathered at a conference summon by the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL), a think tank in Greensboro, NC. The goal was to examine current leadership practices and needs. Participants focused on the fact that changing conditions in many organisations require leaders to develop new skills and perspectives. References: Businessballs.com Harvard Business School, (2005). Becoming an effective leader, Publish in USA ISBN: 1-59139-780-9 The Role of Communication in Leadership Strategic communication has never been more important than it is today. Employees expect to know about their companys plans, and they assume that they will participate in their companys growth. That means that leaders must take communication a personal priority and drive its value throughout the organisation. Mai and Akerson argue that leadership communication is not simply a technical skill, but â€Å"the critical leadership competency for guiding organisations through conditions of heightened transition and turmoil.† Any competitive company they said has three critical goals: †¢ To attract and retain talent †¢ To maintain a steady course through transitions †¢ To stay at the leading edge of its industry through constant innovation and renewal To accomplish these goals, leaders must do three key things: 1- Create a Community First leaders must be community developers, fostering trust and creating meaningful work environment. A direct approach often works well. Saturn, where plant or unit managers take the time to welcome each new hire and explains the companys philosophy. Employees coming from organisations where they had never spoken one-on-one with a senior manager are pleasantly surprised by this. Such personalised face-to-face communication with employees conveys honesty and sincerity. Transparent, honest communication is essential: when leaders communicate candidly, employees are likely to reciprocate, extending confidence back to the company. 2- Steer a Steady Course Leaders should act as navigators, setting direction and instigating action, particularly during times of transition. At the annual meeting, the companys leaders met in groups to discuss the organisations future, stimulated by worksheets that provided them with information about deregulation across other industries, statistics and possible new company configurations. After the meeting leaders took the work sheets and held similar meetings of their own with in their individual divisions. 3- Commit to continual renewal Case Study of Tesco Tesco uses critical success factors as a basis for its management and leadership competencies. According to Helen Cecil, head of HR, the emphasis at senior management level is on developing leaders rather than managers. This aim, she says is based on the companys recognition that â€Å"the difference we deliver to our customers is through our people. Management levels in stores have been reduced from seven or eight down to three and She also said that Staff now expects much more from managers. Managers have to be able to inspire, initiate change and motivate staff to deliver results. The company also recognises that the potential benefits of new technology, new management systems and new organisational structures cannot realise without effective leadership. Tesco is developing global leaders as the business becomes more international. The company uses business schools and external consultants, with in company assessment panels that identify future leaders whose development is focused on strategy, operations and human resource management.

west side stadium :: essays research papers

West Side Stadium   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  There is a lot of controversy over the plans for a new West Side stadium. The mayor says the stadium is necessary to win the honor of being the Host City for the 2012 Olympics. The stadium will also be home of the Jets. His opinion is that the stadium would do nothing but good for the city despite criticism from people saying the money should be added to the education budget. I believe the stadium should be built.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  One thing that the stadium would do that I feel is important is that if we were to get the Olympics it would give the world something besides 9/11 when they think of New York. That is very important to me because I am tired of every time I’m on a trip some one telling me there sorry when they find out I live in New York. The money the Olympics will bring into the city will also be pretty substantial. It could really help to boost the economy. There will be many wealthy people visiting the city, some for the very first time. Athletes but trainers, hardcore fans, camera crews and reporters from all over the world. Their personal spending alone will probably add up to at least a million dollars. The West Side stadium is a terrific idea for a lot of other reasons as well. The West Side stadium project will create hundreds of jobs bringing down the unemployment rate. Which is especially good in a city that has had an on going problem with its unemployment rate. The West Side Stadium will also put an end to the monopoly that cablevision has over sports entertainment in this city. The same company that funds the ads bad mouthing the mayor and the plans for a West Side Stadium.

How Do Economic Incentives Affect Social Preferences and Behavior Essay

For decades economic theories have relied heavily on the effectiveness of material incentives (Fehr & Gachter, 2001). According to the traditional exchange theory all people are exclusively motivated by their own material self-interest. It predicts that the introduction of a penalty will reduce the occurrence of the behavior that is subject to the fine. On the other hand it states that introducing a material incentive will lead to an increase of the behavior related to the bonus. Based on economic theory, incentives have become increasingly popular and are used to increase certain behaviors in various fields including environmental policy (Andersen & Sprenger, 2000; Barde & Smith, 1997; Baumol & Oates, 1988; Kahn, 1995; all cited in ThOgersen, 2003), household surveys (Singer, 2002) and education policy (Fryer, 2011). On the other side, penalties have been used to reduce free-riding (Feldman, Papadimitriou, Chuang, & Stoica, 2006), and crimes (Akerlof & Dickens, 1982). There is much evidence that supports the basic premise of economics that incentives are effective (Gibbons, 1997; Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 2000; all cited in Benabou & Tirole, 2004). However, a large body of literature in psychology has shown that explicit incentives lead to decreased motivation and reduced performance in the long run (Deci & Ryan, 1985; as cited in Benabou & Tirole, 2004). Titmuss (1970, as cited in Benabou & Tirole, 2004) was the first who claimed that people might adopt a ‘market mentality’ when they are exposed to explicit economic incentives. He found that paying blood donors for donating blood could actually reduce supply. In the beginning there was little hard evidence that social preferences affected individual behavior, but empirical and theoretical advances over the past decades provide the basis for more support. For example, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) found that introducing a monetary fine for late-coming parents in day-care centers led to a significant increase in late-coming. There was no reduction in late-coming after the fine was removed. Also Fryer (2011) didn’t find evidence that providing financial incentives to teachers to increase student performance had any effect. Partly because of these findings, terms as trust, reciprocity, gift exchange and fairness have appeared in the empirical study and modeling of principal-agent relationships (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). This highlights the importance of the influence that social preferences have on incentives. Based on the contradictions mentioned above I conclude that a more thorough analysis is needed in order to understand the influence of incentives on behavior. I’ll focus on the interplay between incentives and social preferences and how this affects behavior. In this paper I will review several mechanisms that can explain how incentives can be less effective than economic theories predict and how they can even have counterproductive effects. Furthermore I will indicate the implications of the (non-)effectiveness of incentives for economic policy. Overview of past research According to the definition of Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012), social preferences refer to â€Å"motives such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic pleasure in helping others, inequity aversion, ethical commitments and other motives that induce people to help others more than would an own-material-payoff maximizing individual† (p. 4). Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) have indicated the most important types of preferences that have been uncovered by the literature. I will shortly review them below. The first important type of social preference is the preference for reciprocal fairness or reciprocity. An individual is reciprocal when he responds kindly to actions that are perceived as kind, and when he responds hostile to actions that are perceived as hostile. Whether some action is perceived as hostile of kind depends on the unfairness or fairness of the intention and on the consequences that are associated with the action. A second social preference type is inequity aversion. According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999; as cited in Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002) â€Å"inequity averse persons want to achieve an equitable distribution of material resources† (p. C3). Inequity averse persons show altruistic behavior if the other persons’ payoffs are below an equitable level. However, if the other persons’ payoffs are exceeding the equitable level an inequity averse person want to decrease the other persons’ payoffs. There are a lot of similarities in the behavior of reciprocal and inequity averse individuals, since both concepts depend in some way on the perception of fairness. Pure altruism is the third type of social preference, which is very different from the former two. Altruism can be seen as an unconditional form of kindness (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002), as an altruistic person would never take an action that decreases another person’s payoff. The problem with pure altruism is that it cannot explain conditional cooperation, that is, people want to increase their voluntary cooperation in response to cooperation of others. The last social preference type that Fehr and Fischbacher (2002) mentioned is envious or spiteful preferences. An envious or spiteful person always values the payoff of other agents negatively. Therefore the envious person is willing to decrease the other agent’s payoff even if it brings along a personal cost to himself. This happens irrespective of fair or unfair behavior of the other agent and irrespective of the pay-off distribution (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2002). However, spitefulness can’t explain why it is that the same individuals sometimes are willing to help others at a personal cost, while sometimes they harm other people. Over the past decades, many studies have confirmed that a significant fraction of individuals engage in reciprocal or altruistic behaviors (Buraschi & Cornelli, 2002; as cited in Benabou & Tirole, 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2000). Thus, many individuals do not only care about the material resources allocated to them, but also care about material resources allocated to other relevant agents. To give an overview of the incentive effects on preferences, two distinctions are made: the nature and the causes of incentives (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). Concerning the nature of incentives, people often respond to the mere presence of incentives, rather than to their extent (Gneezy, 2003; as cited in Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). However, the extent of an incentive may also play a role. Therefore the effects of incentives on social preferences can be either categorical or marginal or a combination of the two. Bowles and Polania-Reyes (2012) also make a distinction between 2 causes of incentive effects on preferences. First, incentives can affect the environment in which preferences are learned. When this happens, the preferences are referred to as endogenous preferences. Second, the extent or presence of incentives affect the behavioral salience of an individual’s social preferences. When incentives constitute different states, we refer to social preferences as state-dependent preferences. There are three mechanisms that make social preferences state-dependent. First, by implementing an incentive, the principal discloses information about his intentions, about his beliefs about the target of the incentives and about the targeted behavior. This information might affect the agent’s social preferences which in turn affect the agent’s behavior. Second, incentives provide situational cues for appropriate behavior. Finally, incentives may lead to a crowding out of intrinsic motivations. The crowding-out effect is based on the intuition that the presence of punishments or rewards spoils the reputational value of good deeds. This creates doubt within the individual about the extent to which he performed because of the incentives rather than for himself. This phenomenon is also referred to as the ‘overjustification effect’ (Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973; as cited in Benabou & Tirole, 2004). In the next part of this paper I’ll give experimental evidence for both endogenous preferences and for all 3 mechanisms that make preferences incentive-state-dependent. Furthermore, I’ll give examples of experiments where crowding in has been found and explain the underlying mechanisms. 1. Endogenous preferences: incentives alter how new preferences are learned Preferences are endogenous if someone’s experiences lead to durable changes in motivations and eventually result in a change in behavior in certain situations (Bowles, 2008). In most cases, experiments have a few hours duration and therefore it’s unlikely to uncover the mechanisms that are involved in the process of durable change of preferences. Although it’s hard to explore the causal mechanisms at work, there exist some experiments that do show a durable learning effect (Irlenbausch & Sliwka, 2005; Falkinger, Fehr, Gachter, & Winter-Ebmer, 2000; all cited in Bowles, 2008). Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a), for example, examined if the introduction of a monetary fine for late-coming parents in day-care centers would lead to reduction of late-coming. However, the amount of late-coming parents didn’t decrease, but increased significantly. Thus incentives led to more self-interested behavior. More importantly, after the fine was removed no reduction in late-coming parents was shown, meaning that there was some durable learning effect going on. 2. State-dependent preferences: incentives provide information about the principal When an incentive is imposed on an agent, he may infer information about the principal who designed the incentive. He may, for example, infer information about the principal’s beliefs regarding the agent, and about the nature of the task that has to be done (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). This information can lead to a negative response to fines that are imposed by principals. Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) designed a sequentially played social dilemma experiment and examined how sanctions intended to prevent cheating affect human altruism. Participants in the role of ‘investor’ could transfer a certain amount of money to another player, the ‘trustee’. The experimenter tripled this amount. After tripling the money, the trustee was given the opportunity to back-transfer some of this money to the investor. The investor could indicate a desired level of the back-transfer before he transferred the money to the trustee. In the incentive-condition the investor even had the option to impose a fine if the trustee would send a back-transfer that was less than the desired amount. Instead of imposing a fine the investor could also choose to decline the use of the fine. The decision of imposing or declining the fine was known to the trustee. In the trust-condition the investor could not make use of incentives. Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) found that generous initial transfers by investors were reciprocated with greater back-transfers by trustees. However, the use of the fine reduced the return transfers, while renouncing the fine in the incentive-condition increased back-transfers. This means that sanctions revealing selfish or greedy intentions destroy altruistic cooperation almost completely (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). In another experiment by Fehr and Schmidt (2007), principals could choose between offering a bonus contract or a combination contract (which was a combination of the bonus contract with a fine) to the employee. What they found was that agents perceive that principals who are less fair are more likely to choose a combined contract and are less likely to pay the announced bonus. Furthermore the effect of effort on the bonus paid is twice as large in the pure bonus condition compared to the combined contract condition. The positive response to the principal’s renunciation of the fine option can be seen as a categorical effect. The threat of a fine led to diminishment of the trustee’s reciprocity. 3. State-dependent preferences: incentives may suggest permissible behavior The experiments that will be described here, differ from the experiments mentioned above in the way that here incentives are implemented exogenously by the experimenter. This means that incentives do not provide any information about the beliefs or intentions of other experimental subjects. In a lot of situations people look for clues of appropriate behavior. These are often provided by incentives. These framing effects have been investigated in many studies. Hoffman, McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994; as cited in Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012) found that by making a game sound more competitive after relabeling it, generosity and fair-minded behavior in the participants were diminished. In some other studies (Ellingsen, Johannesson, Munkhammar, & Mollerstrom, 2008; as cited in Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012) the framing effect even appeared to have changed subjects’ beliefs about the actions of others. Framing effects can also be induced in other ways than simply renaming the experiment. Providing an incentive may already provide a powerful frame for the decision maker. In an experiment of Schotter, Weiss and Zapater (1996) subjects played an Ultimatum Game experiment in which player 1 is given an endowment and asked to propose a part of this endowment to player 2. Player 2 can either accept or reject this division. If he accepts, the proposed division is implemented. However, if he rejects both players receive nothing. Schotter et al (1996) found that if a market-like competition was included in the game, that is, subjects with lower earnings would be excluded from the second round in the game, player 1 proposed less generous divisions to player 2. Furthermore, lower offers were accepted by player 2. The authors interpreted these results as that implementing market-like competition â€Å"offers justifications for actions that in isolation would be unjustifiable† (p. 38). Thus, providing incentives in the form of a competition can lead to moral disengagement. The framing effects of incentives can occur in cases of government-imposed incentives as well. An example comes from an experiment from Cardenas, Stranlund and Willis (2000) where they studied the effects of external regulatory control of environmental quality. Participants were asked to choose how much time they would spend collecting firewood from a forest, while being aware that this activity has a negative effect on local water quality. Two treatments were considered to examine whether external control may crowd out group-oriented behavior. All subjects played eight initial rounds of the game without any treatment, that is, without being able to communicate with each other and without external regulation. After the initial rounds, one subset of groups played additional rounds in which they were able to communicate. The other subset of groups was confronted with a government-imposed regulation. The regulation also involved the possibility of imposing a fine to subjects that would withdraw too much of the firewood. Although standard economic theory predicted that the regulation would increase group-oriented behavior, this wasn’t the case. When subjects were able to communicate they made way more efficient decisions. However, regulatory external control caused subjects to make decisions that were closer to their self-interest. This means that the fine, although it was insufficient to enforce the social optimum, extinguished the subjects’ ethical aptitudes. 4. State-dependent preferences: incentives may compromise intrinsic motives and self-determination A third reason why social preferences may be state dependent is because providing incentives may lead to motivational crowding out. As Bowles (2008) put it: â€Å"where people derive pleasure from an action per se in the absence of other rewards, the introduction of explicit incentives may ‘overjustify’ the activity and reduce the individual’s sense of autonomy† (p. 607). According to Deci (1975; as cited in Bowles, 2008) the underlying psychological mechanism appears to be a desire for â€Å"feelings of competence and self-determination that are associated with intrinsically motivated behavior† (p. 1607). There is a large body of literature on the psychology of intrinsic motivations going back to the early work of Festinger (1957; as cited in ThOgersen, 2003) and his cognitive dissonance theory. In the past decades a lot of experiments have been done to test the crowding out of intrinsic motivation. One of these studies comes from Gneezy & Rustichini (2000b) who tested the effects of monetary incentives on student performance. 180 students were asked to answer 50 questions of an IQ test. They were all paid 60 NIS (New Israeli Shekel) for their participation in the experiment. The students were divided into 4 different groups, which were all corresponding to 4 different treatments. The students in the first treatment group were only asked to answer as many questions as possible. The students in the second group got an extra payment of 10 cents of a NIS per question that they answered correctly. Subjects in the third group were promised 1 NIS, and subjects in the fourth group 3 NIS per question that they answered correctly. The average number of questions correctly was approximately 28 in the first group and declined to 23 in the second group. Furthermore, the number increased to 34 in both the third and the fourth group. The differences in performance were significant. In a second experiment Gneezy & Rustichini (2000b) tested the effect of incentives on volunteer work performed by high school children. 180 children were divided into three groups. The subjects in the first group constituted the control group and they were only given a speech about the importance of volunteer work. The second group was given a speech as well, but was also promised to receive 1 per cent of the total amount of donations collected. The third group was promised 10 per cent of the amount collected. The average amount collected was highest in the first group and lowest in the second group. The average amount that was collected by the third group was higher than that of the second group but not as high of the amount that was collected in the first group. Also these results were significant. It appears to indicate that the effect of incentives can be detrimental, at least for small amounts. In another experiment, Falk and Kosfeld (2006; as cited in Bowles 2008) tested the idea that control aversion based on the self-determination motive is the reason that incentives reduce performance. They used a principal-agent game where agents could choose a level of production that was beneficial for the principal, but costly for themselves. If the agent chose to produce nothing, he would get a maximal pay-off. Before the agent’s decision the principal could decide to leave the choice f production level completely to the agent or to impose a certain lower bound on the agent’s production level. The experimenter varied the bounds across the treatments and the principal could only choose to impose it or not. Results showed that when the principal imposed the bound, the agents chose a lower production level than when the principal didn’t impose a bound. The ‘untrusting’ principals earned half of the profits of those who did trust the agents and thus didn’t impose a bound. In post-surveys, the agents indicated that imposing the lower bound was perceived as a signal of distrust. The results of this experiment suggest that the desire for self-determination and control aversion are not the only effects of imposing the bound. Imposing this minimum was informative for the agents about what the principals’ beliefs were regarding the agents: the principals who imposed the bounds had lower expectations of the agents. Thus, the results in the experiment of Falk and Kosfeld (2006; as cited in Bowles 2008) seem to be the result of both negative information about the principal (or incentive designer) as well as the result of self-determination. 5. Crowding in Although a lot of experiments show that providing incentives has a negative effect on social preferences, there is also some evidence that crowding in can occur, that is, social preferences and incentives enhance the effect on each other. This might happen when an incentive provides good news about the principal’s type or intentions, for example when he offers the agent a reward rather than a fine. It is also seen in experiments where the incentive designers are peers in a public goods game who pay to punish free riders in order to sustain cooperative behavior (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). The phenomenon of crowding in is interesting since it indicates how policies could be implemented optimally and how incentives and social preferences could become complements rather than substitutes (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). Besides that, it appears that crowding in happens often in Public Goods games and Common Pool Resources games, which display the same characteristics as public policy settings. Below I’ll give an example of an experiment in which crowding in was found. Fehr and Gachter (2000) conducted a public good experiment with and without the opportunity to punish. In the no-punishment treatment the dominant strategy is complete free-riding. In the punishment treatment free-riders could be punished by their altruistic peers, since it was costly for them to punish. Therefore, if there were only selfish individuals, as assumed in economic theory, there wouldn’t be a difference between the two treatments. However, in the no-punishment treatment the contributions of the players were substantially lower than in the punishment treatment. This suggests that powerful motives drive the punishments of free-riders. Furthermore there was evidence that the more free-riders deviated from cooperation, the more they were being punished. There are several mechanisms that can explain the effect of crowding in. In the first place when a peer imposes a fine on a free-rider, this may activate a feeling of shame. Barr (2001; as cited in Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012) found that just a verbal message of disapproval already can have a positive effect on the free riders’ contributions. A second mechanism that appears to be at work it that nobody wants to be the cooperator while all others are defecting. Shinada and Yamagishi (2007, as cited in Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012) found that students cooperated more in a public goods experiment when they were assured that defecting free-riders would be punished. They just didn’t want to be exploited by defectors. A third mechanism underlying crowding in was consistent with the findings of an experiment by Vertova and Galbiati (2010, as cited in Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). They found that when a stated obligation was introduced, this produced a larger effect when it was accompanied with a small monetary incentive, rather than with a big incentive or than when no incentives were offered. The authors interpreted this phenomenon as that the salience of the stated obligation is enhanced by large explicit incentives. The latter phenomenon was also found in Ireland, where a small tax was imposed on plastic grocery bags (Rosenthal, 2008; as cited in Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). After two weeks there was a 94% decline in the use of these bags. This result can be explained by the fact that the introduction of the tax was preceded by a large publicity campaign. Thus, the incentive was implemented jointly with a message of social obligation and it seems that it served as a reminder of the importance of one’s civic duty. Implications for policy Many policies are based on the self-interest hypothesis that predicts that all individuals are self-regarding. However, as we have seen social preferences play an important role as well when it comes down to behavior. This would mean that a lot of current policies are non-optimal. Therefore a big challenge is facing the mechanism designer: how to design optimal fines, taxes or subsidies when the individual’s responses depend on his preferences which in turn are determined by the incentive imposed? In most experiments the effects of incentives were studies and afterwards the mechanisms were identified that could explain the results. However, one of the problems that the designer is facing is that he must determine beforehand how incentives will affect behavior. Based on the experiments that have been done, several guidelines can be drawn. The first is that when crowding out is found, social preferences and incentives are substitutes. This means that a negative effect of incentives is less likely to be found when the social preferences are minimal. In contrast, when social preferences are prevalent among a society, it may be more convenient to reduce the use of incentives. Also, policies that are implemented in order to enhance social preferences will be more effective when incentives are little used. The second stems from Titmuss’s claim that if the crowding out effect is so strong that the incentive has an opposite effect than intended, incentives should be used less. However, in many cases the effectiveness of incentives is not reversed, but blunted and then the implications for the optimal use of incentive isn’t that obvious (Bowles & Hwang, 2008). How Bowles & Hwang (2008) state it: â€Å"the reduced effectiveness of the incentive associated with crowding out would entail a larger incentive for a planner designing a subsidy to ensure compliance with a quantitative target† (p. 4). Present evidence is insufficient in providing enough guidelines to the policy maker who wants to know ex ante what the effects are of the incentives that he considers to implement (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). What we do know is that the same incentives imposed by individuals who have no personal benefit but only want to promote pro-social behavior (as in the experiment of Fehr & Gachter, 2000) are more likely to increase contributions than when imposed by an untrusting principal (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). Furthermore it seems to be important to let the agent understand that the desired change in behavior would be socially beneficial rather than that the incentive is perceived as a threat to her autonomy or reflecting badly on the designer’s intentions (Bowles & Polania-Reyes, 2012). Conclusion The self-interest hypothesis assumes that individuals are only motivated by their own material self-interest. This assumption is used in the design of many policies. However, in the past decades a lot of experiments have shown that other-regarding social preferences rather than self-regarding preferences play a role in behavior. We have seen that some mechanisms can induce pro-socially oriented individuals to behave as they are selfish. On the other hand, there are also examples of experiments in which mechanisms induce self-interested individuals to behave at a more pro-social level. Thus, incentives can lead to both crowding out and crowding in phenomena. Whereas negative information about the principal and the over-justification effect may lead to crowding out of intrinsic motivation to contribute to a good, altruistic punishment by peers who do not benefit personally is more likely to increase contributions. Furthermore it seems important to make individuals aware of their civic duty, as was shown in Ireland where a small tax was imposed on plastic bags. Regarding to public policy, we have seen that small differences in institutional design can lead to many different outcomes. This imposes a big challenge on the policy designer who has to know ex ante what the effects of the incentive that he is considering to implement will be. When social preferences are not present, incentives may have a positive effect, predicted by economic theory. However, in areas where social preferences do play a role, the use of monetary incentives needs to be reconsidered.

The Sexual Practices in the Youths

The Sexual Practices in the Youths Abstract There has been a rise in sexual awareness among the teenagers. The statistical comparison of the current and past generations sharply differs. The mass media is largely to blame for the sexual practices in the youths.Advertising We will write a custom research paper sample on The Sexual Practices in the Youths specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More Introduction Are todays teens becoming more sexually active and aware at a younger age than previous generations? Currently, teenagers have more information on sexuality while some have sexual experiences at a tender age. Parents and the media have to combine efforts to fight the vice. Literature review Chapman, J. (2000). Adolescent sex and mass media: a developmental approach. Miami: Herald. According to Chapman, the media is to be blame for the sharp rise in adolescent sex. To solve the problem, Chapman recommends the establishment of a body to monitor the contribution of media on sex uality. Brown, D. (2002). Mass media influences on sexuality. New York: Harper Row. Brown also blames the media as the major source of moral decadence. He calls for the restrictions of teenagers from accessing obscene materials from the media. Ponton, L. (2000). The Sex Lives of Teenagers. New York: Dutton.Advertising Looking for research paper on social sciences? Let's see if we can help you! Get your first paper with 15% OFF Learn More Ponton is concerned about the sharp rise in teen pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases. Therefore, she recommends an explicit study to solve the problem. Analysis The first two authors of the above books point a blame finger at the media and the parents while the third author recommends for clear study to establish the origin of the problem. Methodology Through epidemiological approach, a retrospective study of teenagers (13-18 years). There will be an assessment of media and lifestyle comparing the behavior in the a ge groups. Results will determine the conclusion and recommendations. Hypothesis and Conclusion Sex is rampant among the teenagers. I believe my research will establish the cause of sexual exposure in teenagers and the subsequent ways to solve the problem. References Brown, D. (2002). Mass media influences on sexuality. New York: Harper Row. Chapman, J. (2000). Adolescent sex and mass media: a developmental approach. Miami: Herald. Ponton, L. (2000). The Sex Lives of Teenagers. New York: DuttonAdvertising We will write a custom research paper sample on The Sexual Practices in the Youths specifically for you for only $16.05 $11/page Learn More

Top 15 Ways to Use Social Media to Get a Job

Top 15 Ways to Use Social Media to Get a Job On September 15, I had the privilege of participating in a Twitter chat on using social media to get a job. Participants included many journalism professors who had spot-on advice for students and other job seekers, and who confirmed some best practices for using Twitter and LinkedIn to find a job. One professor, Samra Bufkins MJ, APR (@Samjb) stated that she requires all her students to have a LinkedIn profile – and she grades it! Not only that, but she requires them to create a profile both at the beginning of the semester and at the end, hammering in the importance of keeping your LinkedIn profile fresh and up-to-date! Here are the top 10 pieces of advice I gathered from the chat: Recruiters and employers are looking for you on LinkedIn. Use keywords that will help you appear in searches, and complete the Skills section which is searched by recruiters (@BrendaBernstein)! Always post a professional picture of yourself on LinkedIn (no cats or significant others – reserve those for Facebook!). Build and expand your LinkedIn network in smart ways, choosing the people you want to connect with and whose connections you would want to connect with (@BrendaBernstein). Students can start by reaching out to current and former professors and influentials they meet in their communities (@DarrinDevault). Don’t be afraid to ask for introductions from mutual connections or to interact with people by asking questions and sending compliments (@Samjb, @kingisafink). Follow organizations and companies that interest you on Twitter and LinkedIn, and connect with key people at companies you want to work for. Use the Find Alumni feature on LinkedIn (@jmeucci). Alumni can help you get in front of people who might otherwise pass you over (@Samjb). If you blog, write for student media, or do freelance work, post links to your work on LinkedIn (@Samjb). Read this article on How to Use Twitter to Find a Job. If you get somebody’s business card at a conference, connect with them using a personal connect request within 24 hours (@Samjb). (This tweet was hailed as bordering on â€Å"Biblical advice† by Jason Meucci (@jmeucci)). Supporting #5, always make LinkedIn connection requests from your computer, not from your phone, and do it from the person’s actual full profile, not from a list (@BrendaBernstein). That way you can personalize your request. Some professors will not accept any invitations that are not personalized (@DarrinDevault). Don’t be shy about displaying your accomplishments (@kingisafink). When engaging in ALL social media, including Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, etc., be aware that people could be watching. Be careful what you post! Teach others how to use social media and you will become better at it yourself (@uw_sjmc). And the more you use it, the better you’ll get! If you are a student, check out LinkedIn’s student guide to using LinkedIn. Congratulate people in your network on their new jobs, awards, etc. And wish them a happy birthday! You can find out about these events from your Connections tab on LinkedIn. Turn real life connections into social media connections, and vice versa (@kingisafink). The online world does not exist in a vacuum! The above 15 tips speak for themselves. Whether you are a student or seasoned professional, start putting them into practice now! And of course, my book, How to Write a KILLER LinkedIn Profile, soon to be released in print, covers more LinkedIn job search tips than could ever be addressed in an hour-long chat session. If you are not on my e-list and haven’t gotten your free excerpt yet, please click here to join!